In the distance lies the only passage from the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau into the Hexi Corridor: the Dangkin Mountain Gap — with the Qilian Mountain ranges to the east and the Altun Mountains, connecting to the Kunlun range, to the west. From the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, a steep winding road descends continuously for 48 kilometers through this gap before entering the Hexi Corridor, dropping more than 2,000 meters in elevation. After coming down the mountain, the pressure in your eardrums builds so intensely that you can barely hear a thing.
Historically, this ancient route allowed any power controlling the Hexi Corridor to move smoothly into the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau — and vice versa. When the Central Plains dynasties were strong, they could pass through Dunhuang via this mountain gap and march southward to control the Dachaidan region on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, then seize Golmud and push into Tibet all the way to Lhasa. They could also move westward from Dachaidan — the central hub of the plateau — into Ruoqiang, reaching Lop Nor on the edge of the Taklimakan Desert, and advance along the desert’s edge to seize the oasis strongholds of southern Xinjiang one by one, all the way to Kashgar. A second route could proceed from Dunhuang through the Jade Gate Pass to Turpan, then north through Balikun to Ürümqi, sweeping through the towns of northern Xinjiang along the edge of the Dzungarian Basin.
When the Central Plains’ grip on the Hexi Corridor weakened, forces from the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau could pass through this gap and strike directly at Dunhuang, break through Jiayuguan Pass eastward to reach Guazhou, Suzhou, Ganzhou, and Liangzhou in the Longright region, and push east to threaten Chang’an. To the west, they could swing around behind the defensive lines at Yangguan and the Jade Gate Pass, then split forces in two to nibble away at the towns along the desert edges of both northern and southern Xinjiang. This is precisely what the Tibetan Empire (Tufan) did: when the Tang Dynasty pulled its main forces from the Hexi Corridor during the An-Shi Rebellion, the Tibetan Empire surged forward, occupied the corridor, severed the Western Regions, and gradually eroded the Anxi Protectorate’s control over the Tianshan ranges north and south.
Today, tunnels have been built on both sides of this gap — a railway tunnel to the east, a highway tunnel to the west. The pass is no longer the sole strategic chokepoint controlling access from the Hexi Corridor into the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.
Yuna: Looking forward to more commentary and scenic photos — 2023-08-23 12:21 Commander’s reply to Yuna: This isn’t scenery — this is a strategic corridor and a logistics supply route!
Star Friend: Commander, are you out there scouting targets in Northwest China, Central Asia, and Europe? — 2023-08-23 14:54
Juewu: Commander, how is China’s right-of-way strategy progressing? The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway still hasn’t broken ground. — 2023-08-23 18:33
Ling’er Running: To command troops in battle, you must know the heavens above and the terrain below. Heavenly timing is an uncontrollable factor that often decides the outcome of war; geography, however, is eternal — fixed in place — and determines the entire strategic direction of troop movements.
Zhou Yu of the Three Kingdoms exploited a rare winter southeast wind to launch the fire attack at Red Cliffs, crushing Cao Cao’s forces. Guan Yu exploited the summer flood season in the Xiangfan region to drown the Seven Armies, shaking all of China.
As for geography: why did Zhuge Liang reject Wei Yan’s Ziwu Valley gambit? Because Liang’s strategy was to first take the Longright region, then the Guanzhong heartland — for in the early Eastern Han, the northwestern warlord Wei Xiao had used the natural barriers of the Long Mountains to withstand Emperor Guangwu’s campaigns for four full years. Liang’s strategy was to hold the Long Mountains, consolidate Longright, and then strike downhill to take Guanzhong. Wei Yan’s Ziwu Valley plan, by contrast, was an extremely high-risk lone-force deep penetration — the Ziwu road was brutal to traverse, with no viable supply lines whatsoever.
Looking across history at every grand unification of China, nearly all proceeded from west to east and from north to south. Why? Because logistics is the decisive factor. China’s terrain descends from west to east, and the great rivers all flow eastward — the cost of moving supplies downstream is far lower than fighting the current going up. Geography, in the end, determines whether you move with the flow or against it.
2023-08-25 10:17 Lulu’s reply to Ling’er Running: — 2023-08-25 15:37 “Give your all in all things” reply to Ling’er Running: Impressive. — 2023-08-25 18:42 Juewu’s reply to Ling’er Running: — 2023-08-26 04:43 Yuna’s reply to Commander: Received! At any time — ready to follow the Commander’s arrangement and direction! — 2023-08-24 20:42